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Le texte est disponible en version anglaise.
Abstract
En admettant une ontologie réaliste du monde des objets physiques et une épistémologie de la connaissance singulière dépendante des objets, nous comparons la poursuite (‘tracking’) des objets dépourvus d’états mentaux avec la poursuite des agents intentionnels. Pour étudier la poursuite située des agents, nous défendons ‘l’approche de la dépendance à l’égard de l’objet’ qui affirme que, dans le cas le plus rudimentaire, les humains poursuivent les agents intentionnels en poursuivant leur corps. Toutefois, nous soutenons que la poursuite des agents intentionnels comme agents intentionnels requière des capacités spécifiques pour détecter et comprendre le mouvement biologique et les états intentionnels. |
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A few remarks
(2 réponses)
David NICOLAS, 29 mars 2005 17:16 UT
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Agent Tracking- a too simplistic account? 
Nivedita Gangopadhyay
24 mars 2005 9:34 UT
While agreeing with the general idea expounded in this paper, I think agent tracking as it has been described here could be a slightly too simplistic account. When one is tracking an agent one of the vital question concerns the task at hand- “What” is it that is being tracked. It is not sufficient to say that the entity being tracked is an intentional agent. Intentional agents, whether human or non-human, could be tracked merely as an agent performing a particular task or they could be tracked as “persons” i.e. as being endowed with a unique personality. For example suppose a person is viewing a game of soccer in a stadium. From where the viewer is it is not possible to distinguish the players as “persons” i.e. as some unique individual and suppose the viewer is not so familiar with the names, features etc. of the players. Under such circumstance the viewer can certainly follow the game, without tracking the players as “persons”, by merely tracking them as intentional agents who are performing certain actions with a ball. Such tracking of intentional agents is nearly similar to the tracking of mere physical objects. Hence in this case the “agent file” functions in more or less the same way as an “object file”. This supports the object-dependent view. But intentional agents can also be tracked as “persons” and here the task would be cognitively more demanding and not the same as the tracking of agents as merely performing some actions. For example- two very close child-hood friends accidentally meet after a gap of many years during which they had no contact what-so-ever with each other. Both of them have now grown up and it is highly possible that their bodies, including their faces, have undergone significant changes. Yet is it absolutely impossible to imagine that they can still recognize each other? In such cases the criteria for uniqueness and identity seem to include something more than just the physical object-dependent identity. There seems to be something stored in the "agent file" that indicates the uniqueness of the "person" despite physical appearances. Also in cases of Multiple Personality Disorder it is not possible to track the different “persons” or personalities by tracking the physical body. Hence it seems that “agent file” could consist of two distinct components- a) “body file”- agent as body performing some action and b) “person file”- agent as person performing some action. “Body file” is closely similar and in certain cases even completely reducible to “object file” whereas “person file” constitutes a distinct mechanism that helps us track intentional agents as persons. Experiments such as the one performed by Simons and Levin indicate that “agent file” could indeed be comprised of two such distinct components as in such cases the subject tracked the speaker simply as a human shape (“body file”) performing some action. Had she tracked the human shape as a “person” (“person file”) she would have immediately noticed the change.
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2 réponses à Agent Tracking- a too simplistic account?:
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Biometrics and the object-dependence view
Maria Rossi, 10 avr. 2005 21:48 UT
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Reply to Nivedita Gangopadhyay
Maria Rossi, 10 avr. 2005 21:40 UT
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