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Moderators
·Sarah Bendaoud
·Roberto Casati
Guest Panel
·Tolga Abaci
·Matthieu Alchourroun
·Yusr Amamou
·Michel-Ange Amorim
·Marlene Arevalo
·Aurelie Arliaud
·Dominique Aubert
·Malika Auvray
·Federico Avanzini
·Carlo Alberto Avizzano
·Jérôme Banal
·Jose Ignacio Barbero
·Nicolas Benguigui
·Daniel Berger
·Delphine Bernardin
·Maria Bernini
·Michele Bezzi
·Cristian Bianchi
·Elodie Blomme
·Julien Boissinot
·Cedrick Bonnet
·Giovanna Bottai
·Ronan Boulic
·Alan Brady
·Fabian Breitenstein
·Françoise Briand
·John Callinan
·Antonio Camurri
·Sergio Canazza
·Marcello Carrozzino
·Sara Casado
·Nicolas Castagné
·Anne Castaing
·Zerrin Celebi
·Marco Celestino
·Juan T. Celigüeta
·Geofrey Cerna
·Astros Chatziastros
·Roberto Chiarvetto
·Chris Christou
·Jan Ciger
·Olivier Coenen
·Paolo Coletta
·Karin Coninx
·Marco Cortopassi
·Damien Couroussé
·Tyra Darville
·Roy C. Davies
·Joan De Boeck
·Giovanni De Poli
·Tom De Weyer
·Gunnar Declerck
·Philippe Depalle
·Giuseppina Di Pietro
·Johannes Dietrich
·Roberto Dillon
·Giuseppe Docile
·Jérôme Dokic
·Sophie Donnadieu
·Lionel Egger
·Joakim Eriksson
·Marc Ernst
·Jean-Loup Florens
·Marco Fontana
·Michele Froli
·Nivedita Gangopadhyay
·Olivier Gapenne
·Helene Gauchou
·Philippe Gelin
·Edouard Gentaz
·Jorge Juan Gil
·Maurizio Giri
·Maria Guglielmi
·Teresa Gutiérrez
·Magnus Haake
·Matthias Hähnle
·Sylvain Hanneton
·Dr. Markus Hauschild
·Veronique Havelange
·Bruno Herbelin
·Gerd Hirzinger
·Thomas Hulin
·Brice Isableu
·José Luis Iskara
·Pierre Jacob
·Gunnar Jansson
·Sophie Jarlier
·Mohamed Jarraya
·Klaus Joehl
·Gerd Johansson
·Bodil Jönsson
·Chris Joslin
·HyungSeok Kim
·Paul Kolesnik
·Cyrille LeRunigo
·Jose Luis Los Arcos
·Etienne Lyard
·Nadia Magnenat-Thalmann
·Ignacio Mansa
·Bruno Mantel
·David Marchal
·Simone Marcheschi
·Sylvain Marlière
·Catherine Marque
·Kerry Marsolek
·Javier Martín
·Alberto Massari
·Cesare Mastroianni
·Luis Matey Munoz
·Barbara Mazzarino
·Georg Michelitsch
·Luca Mion
·Tom Molet
·Antoine Morice
·Roberto Oboe
·Théophile Ohlmann
·Patricia Ostorero
·Fabien Pfaender
·Michal Ponder
·Otniel Portillo
·Mirko Raspolli
·Kirsten Rassmus-Gröhn
·Matthias Rath
·Chris Raymaekers
·Paul Reeve
·Detlef Reintsema
·Bernhard Riecke
·Antonio Rodà
·Eric Ronco
·Emanuele Ruffaldi
·Fabio Salsedo
·Emilio Sánchez
·Joan Savall
·Andrea Schenone
·Guenter Schreiber
·Isabelle Siegler
·Francesco Simoncini
·Edoardo Sotgiu
·Norbert Sporer
·Angel Suescun Cruces
·Ian R Summers
·Dario Taraborelli
·Franco Tecchia
·Daniel Thalmann
·Francois Thil
·Indira Thouvenin
·Nicolas Tixier
·Cosmo Trestino
·Daniele Ugoletti
·Branislav Ulicny
·Daniela Urma
·Peter Vandoren
·Clothilde Vanhoutte
·Frederic Vexo
·Gualtiero Volpe
·Mattias Wallergård
·Marcelo Wanderley
·Friederike Wolf-Oberhollenzer
·Chih-Mei Yang
·Mounia Ziat
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Action and perception are intertwined in complex ways. Perception controls action; action helps perception. But how strong is the tie, and how complex? Would there be perception without action, or action without perception? A current trend in cognitive studies endows action with a wide role in determining perception. The term enaction has been coined to characterize this peculiar approach to perception.
In the framework of the VI PCRD of the European Commission, participants to the Network of Excellence on Enactive interfaces will debate the import and the consequences of the enactive approach to perception.
Guidelines for contributing to the Virtual Workshop In partnership with
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Conclusions
Benoit Bardy
Massimo Bergamasco
Claude Cadoz
Roberto Casati
Elena Pasquinelli
John Stewart
Date of publication: 8 February 2005
Enaction for Robotics
Massimo Bergamasco
Date of publication: 7 February 2005
Enactive Interfaces?
Claude Cadoz
The paper proposes to discuss foundational issues in the characterization of “enactivity” and of “enactive interfaces”. Concerned with material aspects of man-environment relations, it aims at initiating a technological counterpart to the purely cognitive approach of enaction.
Distinguishing ergotic, semiotic and epistemic functions, it focuses on physical objects envisaged in turn as things to be known and transformed, as tools, instruments, machines, representational objects. The computer is then considered as a symbolic representational machine allowing dynamic representation of dynamic systems, of dynamic interactions between their dynamic components and of dynamic interactions between systems and man or environment.
“Enactivity” of interfaces is then related to the fundamental notion of “loop” in relations, at the various nested scales of the whole man-machine-environment system.
Date of publication: 6 December 2004
Enaction in the Context of Musical Performance
Sile O'Modhrain
Georg Essl
Starting from the concept of enaction, we discuss alternative strategies for designing interfaces for computer-based musical instruments, and for
mapping the affordances of such interfaces with parameters of the controlled sounds.
We relate Instrumental Gesture and Gestural Control to embodied action as means for generation of sound. We suggest that grounding of the instrumental gesture in the physics of sound production might become a point of departure for new classes of computer-based musical instruments
and we review some initial examples of such an approach.
Date of publication: 12 November 2004
Structure of sensorimotor contingencies
David Philipona
Theories of perception have been relying for long on the following naïve scheme : first, there is an external world in a given state, then a sensory system affected by this state, and finally cortical areas activated that "generate" qualia by virtue of some properties of their own. This view raises various inverted earth arguments that have much worried philosophers. Do enactive approaches, by emphazing the role of the sensorimotor coupling versus the raw sensory stimulation, overcome the linking problem of qualia ? The general idea is that it is the coupling that makes sense of the sensory inputs, so that the code and substrate in which these inputs are processed are not relevant. But what could it mean for a coupling to make sense ?
Date of publication: 27 October 2004
Merging the senses into a robust percept
Heinrich Buelthoff
To perceive the external environment our brain uses multiple sources of sensory information derived from several different modalities, including vision, touch and audition. All these different sources of information have to be efficiently merged to form a coherent and robust percept. Here we highlight some of the mechanisms that underlie this merging of the senses in the brain. We show that, depending on the type of information, different combination and integration strategies are used and that prior knowledge is often required for interpreting the sensory signals.
Date of publication: 29 September 2004
Situated Research and Design for Everyday Life
Charlotte Magnusson
This paper elaborates theoretical and methodological aspects of design processes in a disability context and aims at relating them to other sciences. It particularly emphasizes the situated aspects of research: the need for being there, with the users in their daily lives, i.e. where the action is. The habitat of most examples is the disability context.
Date of publication: 7 September 2004
The human-robot sensorimotor coupling: an engineering perspective
Antonio Frisoli
This paper will present some assumptions deriving from the application of passivity theory applied to the modeling of human robot-interaction, outlining some applications in the design of haptic interfaces and service robots.
One common assumption used in the study of teleoperator and force feedback systems is that the human behavior during the execution of active tasks can be considered passive from an energetic point of view and its behavior can be described as "spring-like". Is this assumption able to explain the complexity of reflex and muscle properties during movement and the human sensorimotor coupling?
The paper will try to examine why and when human beings adopt either a passive or active behavior during action and perception: is it possible to characterize some driving strategies?
Date of publication: 23 July 2004
Interaction as exchanged actions and their role in visual and auditory feedbacks
Annie Luciani
This paper aims to point out an underestimated difference between "natural world" as "being given", and "machines" - as "being built"-, focusing on forces as intermediate wield variables to describe interacting complex dynamic
systems whose co-evolutions cannot be described "phenomenologically". We will show that to obtain an observable closed-loop system, the relation between human and world have to be supported by a dual input-output paradigm, in which the input (sensors) and outputs (actuators) have to be linked with computational process that necessarily plays the role of a representation of the physical material
object. We will then review several case studies that permit to question the shape, image, and sound relations.
Date of publication: 10 July 2004
Enaction and Engineering
John Stewart
Armen Khatchatourov
Charles Lenay
Our thesis is that all technical artefacts, from stone tools to cars to computers, are "enactive interfaces" that mediate the structural coupling between human beings and the world they live in, and hence bring forth a particular world of lived experience. Thus, the perspective of enaction provides a "middle way" that overcomes the twin pitfalls of a) underestimating the social significance of technology considered as a mere means to a predefined ends; and b) overestimating the role of technology, by considering that "machines" are animate entities with a will of their own that can dominate mankind.
Date of publication: 22 June 2004
The enactive approach to perceptual consciousness
Alva Noë
To be a perceiver is to understand, implicitly, the effects of movement on sensory stimulation. Examples are ready to hand. An object looms larger in the visual field as we approach it, and its profile deforms as we move about it. A sound grows louder as we move nearer to its source. Movements of the hand over the surface of an object give rise to shifting sensations. As perceivers we are masters of this sort of pattern of sensorimotor dependence. This mastery shows itself in the thoughtless automaticity with which we move our eyes, head and body in taking in what is around us. We spontaneously crane our necks, peer, squint, reach for our glasses, or draw near to get a better look (or better to handle, sniff, lick or listen to what interests us). The central claim of the enactive approach is that our ability to perceive not only depends on, but is constituted by, our possession of this sort of sensorimotor knowledge.
Date of publication: 7 June 2004
Multisensory enactive interfaces and the global array
Thomas Stoffregen
Benoit Bardy
Multisensory enactive human-computer interfaces permit users to control some aspects of action relative to virtual worlds. Other aspects of action must be perceived and controlled relative to the real world. The user must be able to distinguish motion relative to the virtual world from motion relative to the real world. The design of multisensory interfaces can facilitate these complementary types of perception-action. We discuss the global array, a recently identified entity that provides information sufficient to achieve successful simultaneous control of different actions relative to different referents.
Date of publication: 21 May 2004
Skill, corporality and alerting capacity in an account of sensory consciousness
Kevin O'Regan
Why does seeing provide us with a qualitatively different sensory experience than hearing, taste or touch? Indeed, why does sensory input provoke a perceived sensory experience at all, when the majority of other neural activity in the brain is not associated with any phenomenal experience? There would seem to be an unbridgeable 'explanatory gap' between what it is like to have a sensory experience, and the neural correlates or physical mechanisms involved.
The present paper shows how a step can be made towards bridging this gap. The approach involves taking an at first sight counterintuitive stance, namely that sensation consists in exercising an exploratory skill.
Date of publication: 7 May 2004
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