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The Web conference Art and Cognition was launched in November 2002 - an interdisciplinary theme explored entirely through the means of the Internet. The novel format that is a Web conference made possible a conversation, virtual but intellectually substantial, between people from a variety of disciplines, backgrounds and nations. Authors from three continents contributed papers and responded to them without having to fly to a central meeting place; and, partly thanks to the free-floating nature of Web-based communication, a dialogue was established between members of disciplines that rarely are able to meet on physical ground. Misunderstandings due to the often rigid boundaries between disciplinary cultures became apparent, as did the possible ways of addressing these misunderstandings. In this way, it appears that the Web is an ideal forum in which to launch innovative, truly cross-disciplinary debates and in which to establish the conceptual groundwork necessary for their development.
We would like to recall here, succintly, the main points that have been discussed in the course of what is no more, and no less, than a brain-storming session on a topic of increasing interest to many people, from scholars, philosophers and scientists, to artists and the lay public. The conference was conceived on the basis of general, ‘meta’ questions. In our call for papers, we merely asked authors to reflect on whether the cognitive sciences could tell us anything of relevance about art; and vice versa, whether an analysis of artistic experience could tell us anything of particular interest about the brain. The resulting ten papers and discussions all represent attempts at addressing these ‘meta’ questions, through which a number of key themes emerged. The ‘round-table’ discussion which this concluding text opens should be an occasion to evaluate the extent to which these themes represent satisfactory answers and to pinpoint the questions that arise out of them.
1. Art and language
The nature of the relation between art and language was raised in at least three papers. Avigdor Arikha explored what he calls “pictorial language”, suggesting that pictures obey a syntax which, once learned, enables one to understand them. In a completely different perspective, Roberto Casati defined works of art as essentially communicative objects that prompt conversation. David Cohen insisted on the role of communicative intentions in the understanding of a work of art. Even if the parallel holds, however, one may argue that language and art each are powerful and highly structured systems of representation, whose primary function is to represent the world, and not necessarily to communicate. How, then, is the “syntax” of the representational systems that are both language and art connected to their communicative use?
2. Art and consciousness
Another central theme of discussion was the view that art itself makes us aware of our perceptual experience. Alva Noë talked of the artist as “a kind of experience engineer”, where “The painter literally enacts the content of a possible experience”. Nicolas Bullot defined experimental art as “any action (whatever media are used for the memory of this action) based on the building of an anchoring situation that takes into account, or reveals, any cognitive or political problem”. In this way one role of art is to make the spectator aware of his/her own way of perceiving the world. How does this notion help us understand the phenomenology of artistic experience? Could it be that this emphasis on awareness is a specific feature of contemporary art, embedded in the historical motivations of the twentieth-century avant-garde? Or is it a fundamental ingredient of all artistic experience, and in this way a key to the understanding of consciousness?
3. Cognition and awareness
Connected to the issue of art’s function in making us aware of our representations is the view that art exploits our perceptual, emotional and cognitive systems but that we do not actually realize that this is the case. François Quiviger’s work on proprioception in Renaissance art and David Freedberg’s theory of response seem to go in the same direction: artistic representation may be a function of the universality and stability of our emotional response to it, but the awareness is of the work as experienced via the response, not of the response itself. How crucial is the awareness of our perceptual and emotional experience in the perception of a work of art?
4. Universality
The measure of emotional response would seem to be a central aspect of the study of art cognition, but questions did arise in the course of the discussion about what criteria such a study should adopt. If one takes artistic experience to have universalisable qualities, and if one assumes that there is a class of specifically artistic emotions, such an investigation should be possible. But a certain scepticism with regard to claims of universality was present throughout the discussion of these issues. The question of the unity of the kind “work of art” - to borrow the title of Roberto Casati’s paper - may indeed presuppose an answer before investigative work on the response to art can be conducted. V. S. Ramachandran’s view of an “Aha” experience as central to such response arises out of such investigative work; but how plausible is it?
5. Historicity and normativity
Underlying these questions, and returning often to the forefront of discussion, was thus the difficulty of studying artistic experience without establishing norms for the definition of what counted as artistic experience in the first place. The problem was raised in various ways, by John Armstrong in his description of Kantian aesthetics, by Alain Grumbach in the analysis of collective efforts at very new sorts of works of art, and by Nicolas Bullot in his recognition of a “normative” undercurrent to many of of the reactions to his paper. Art historians, attuned to the ways in which the inflections of artistic production are specifically configured within historical moments, all tended to share, in this conference, an explicitely normative stance with regard to the objects of artistic experience, but the possibility of a dialogue between cognitive scientists and art practitioners in general clearly depends on a resolution of this debate. Is it possible not to adopt a normative stance, and to suppose that appreciation is a different matter from cognition? In the same way, to what extent is the cognitivist approach to art in conflict with a historicist one?
Feedback
We would like to ask all of you - authors, discussants, participants, silent onlookers - to give us your reactions to the discussions that took place during these few weeks. Clearly, we are left with more questions than answers: does the perception of works of art require specific cognitive resources? How can one evaluate it? Is this evaluation necessarily dependent on norms? And would these norms be meaningful without their history? Can one investigate artistic experience without over-simplifying artistic intention?
What themes do you think should have been introduced or developed further?
We also would appreciate your feedback regarding the technical dimension of the event: Did you find the format useful? Is it easy to use? In what ways could it be improved? Did you find the rhythm of two texts a week satisfactory? Too fast? Too slow? Would you have liked more images? More links? More bibliography? More contact with us, the moderators, or with the authors?
Over to you!
Lastly, we would like to thank you all for your participation. An interactive event of this kind depends for its success on the enthusiasm of the participants, and, if we are to judge by the intensity and the high calibre of the discussions, the idea to launch this conference has clearly paid off.
And now, the debate is wide open. Feel free to submit any comment and any question, on whichever text of the conference, for further discussion. |
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Instigateur d’expérience, réponse à Gloria Origgi
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Bernard Gortais, Feb 14, 2003 15:42 UT
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Art et science
(4 replies)
Caterina Saban, Feb 2, 2003 21:40 UT
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Un état cognito-artistique ?
(0 replies)
pol knots, Jan 30, 2003 16:14 UT
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Reply to J. Dokic : Aesthetical attention and object, H, reflexive procedures, routine disruption at the level of thought 
Maria Rossi
Jan 29, 2003 17:37 UT
This text is a reply to J. Dokic’s comments on my contribution for the symposium. It is related to several points of the general discussion.
Jérôme Dokic: “First, why does he restrict his hypothesis to cognitive relations underlying perceptual attention? Of course these are relations centrally involved in many artistic devices, (1) but I suggest that we extend the account to cognitive relations in general, be they perceptual or not. (I think this is in the spirit of Nicolas’s main insight.) (2) An artistic device is at least a device in which our normal cognitive relationship to the world is somehow disrupted or questioned. However, such disruption can take place at the non-perceptual, intellectual level: think of reading a novel, for instance. (Reading a novel need not disrupt my perceptual attention mechanisms.)”
Reply: (1) I admit this suggestion as crucial. I agree on extending the scope of the disrupting/questioning procedures to cognitive relations in general. My initial account is biased toward the analysis of perceptual processes because routine inhibition/disruption seems, in that particular case, easier to explain. Therefore, the reason for this bias is not a theoretical one; I only thought it was a good starting point for explaining the general insight. Thus, your suggestion is very welcome in order to single out a more general fact. (2) Moreover, your correction should invite us to analyze closely the role of thought and reflection in art appreciation. My stress of this role (in discussions) has been vigorously challenged by Noga Arikha in this symposium (cf. our discussion). Noga’s view may reflect a more widespread conception of art than ours, and has to be taken seriously. The question which remains in my mind is whether this emphasis on the intellectual level is relevant only for conceptual, experimental and avant-garde arts. I do not think so, but this would need to be further argued.
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1 reply to Reply to J. Dokic : Aesthetical attention and object, H, reflexive procedures, routine disruption at the level of thought:
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Reply to J. Dokic (2): attention, immersion, reflection
Maria Rossi
Jan 29, 2003 17:53 UT
J. Dokic: “ (…) (3) In art, disruption of our normal cognitive relations to the world is accompanied by reflection on these very relations – sometimes in a quite abstract way, (4) perhaps essentially using the concept of art itself (“What am I doing here? What is going on? Is this art?”). (5) Now, aesthetic experience has often been described in terms of *immersion* rather than reflection. This is not restricted to traditional art: think of John Cage’s 4’33’’ or Yves Klein’s blue paintings. When we are immersed in a piece of art, our cognitive relationship to it is precisely not made explicit. So I think the notion of immersion should be taken into account along with that of reflection. Both notions are important, and a speculation is that Wollheim’s notion of seeing in is a tentative to integrate them in the specific case of figurative paintings. Sometimes they cannot be integrated. The beauty of John Cage’s silent piece is precisely that it highlights so clearly the tension between immersion and reflection, and shows the impossibility of reconciling them.”
Reply: (3) I agree. (4) One may even think that we cannot account for a number of (experimental, conceptual) artistic devices if we do not take into account that they are sometimes grounded on a (historical) reflection about the concept of art. (5) The distinction between immersion and reflection is another useful distinction. For any given anchoring situation S, the aesthetical mind may have to choose between immersing itself in that particular situation S or reflecting about it. Thinking of this as leading (sometimes) to incompatible attitudes may explain a lot of normative preference/choice about artwork. Many persons may favor artwork as situation for immersion; some others may favor the reflexive phase of artwork scrutinizing. We may expect attentional procedures to be quite different in both cases. In other respects, some artwork kinds may more readily prompt for reflection, whereas others may be optimally organized for facilitating or constraining to immersion.
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Déjà?
(1 reply)
Jose Luis Guijarro, Jan 29, 2003 16:18 UT
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Que ressort-il de ce colloque par delà les divergences?
(1 reply)
Pascale Cartwright, Jan 29, 2003 12:02 UT
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L’art est révélation e l’artiste un témoin
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Giordano Mariani, Jan 28, 2003 10:22 UT
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Thanks / merci, éloge du colloque virtuel, et recherches de formes nouvelles
(2 replies)
Maria Rossi, Jan 28, 2003 3:28 UT
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Trop ou trop peu ?
(1 reply)
jean-francois Doucet, Jan 27, 2003 15:20 UT
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Un colloque passionnant
(2 replies)
Bernard Gortais, Jan 27, 2003 14:13 UT
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Thank you, merci.
(1 reply)
Pascale Cartwright, Jan 27, 2003 10:02 UT
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